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NOTE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE
PROVISIONS AND THE RIGHT TO HOUSING
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive problem of homelessness has increasingly become a
major social and economic concern in America, affecting a diverse
number of persons nationwide, and, perhaps most sadly, the children of
our nation. Public officials and policymakers from all levels of
government have debated possible solutions to this problem through such
means as enacting welfare laws and other cash assistance programs.
This note explores state constitutions as one avenue for addressing
the homelessness problem. I will contend that state constitutions are an
appropriate place to include provisions setting forth an obligation to aid
the needy, including homeless citizens. A state constitutional provision
would help to establish an imperative for state legislatures to address
homelessness, and would provide an added basis on which courts could
enforce and interpret state and local social welfare laws so as to maintain
adequate levels of assistance to the homeless.
To support this contention, I will provide case studies from various
states, some of whose constitutions contain explicit social welfare
sections. In discussing the inclusion of such a provision within a state
constitution, I will explore such issues as whether a constitutional social
welfare provision should mandate specific levels of assistance to
homeless persons, or whether, and if so, to what extent, the legislature
should be given discretion to address the problem of homelessness
through statutory means and through allocating responsibility to
administrative agencies. I will contend that state constitutional provisions
regarding social welfare should not establish specific levels of assistance
by which legislatures must abide, but rather set forth a broader constitutional duty to aid the poor and homeless, to be reinforced by a heightened level of judicial scrutiny of state legislation affecting assistance to
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the needy.
To aid in ensuring that a constitutional provision will play a strong
role in combatting the homeless problem and go beyond mere hortatory
language, I propose that, at the least, the state constitutional provision
include guidelines applicable to the legislature and administrative social
services agencies in the establishment and maintenance of social welfare
benefit programs for the prevention of homelessness and provision of aid
for housing. Guidelines should include: first, that shelter is a basic
necessity and that those unable to provide for themselves are entitled to
look to government for aid; second, a section mandating legislatures to
adopt measures for providing aid; and third, a provision requiring
periodic reassessments of the levels of assistance to the poor, using then
current economic conditions as a benchmark. Although the presence of
such a constitutional provision will by no means solve the problem of
homelessness, it has the potential to send a strong message to the
legislature to enact laws to assist the homeless and to the courts to serve
as a check on the legislature to ensure that legislative compliance occurs.
II.

HOMELESSNESS: ORIGINS AND SCOPE OF PROBLEM,
WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CHILDREN
A.

Level and Composition of Homeless Population

The number of homeless persons in this country is difficult to
estimate, much less state with precision, given their invisibility, their
absence from overall Census Bureau poverty figures and their lack of a
political voice. One commentator noted that the homeless population of
the U.S. ranges from 250,000 to 3,000,000.' Obtaining a clear picture
of the homeless population is also difficult because of its wide diversity.
According to one report from the Interagency Council on the Homeless,
nationally, single men comprise 75% of the homeless, and mothers with
children comprise approximately 20% of the homeless population.2
Moreover, homelessness often is only one of the major problems facing
those lacking adequate shelter. Major barriers to their participation in the
wider society prevent the homeless from lifting themselves out of
poverty. Further, a considerable number of the homeless suffer from
mental illness, making it impossible for them to engage in steady

1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Right Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum
Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REv. 525, 527 (1993).
2. Deborah Parker, Right to Shelterfor the Homeless, 81 GEO. L. J. 829, 838 (1993).
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employment,3 and an estimated 35% of homeless persons are drug or
alcohol abusers.4
The ranks of the poor, many of whom are homeless or lack adequate
shelter, have been increasingly filled by children. The number of
children in poverty steadily increased during the past decade. Approxi-

mately 12.4 million children live in families whose incomes are below
As Marion Wright, Edelman, founder of the
the poverty level.'
Children's Defense Fund, reported, "children are the poorest age group
in America." 6 Children among the homeless poor face a myriad of
problems, both physical and mental. For example, such children are
likely to suffer from malnourishment and inadequate physical development due to a lack of pre and post-natal care, as well as an absence of
preventive measures such as immunization! Emotionally, homeless
children are likely to have a low sense of self-esteem and motivation and

will lack intellectual stimulation. Homeless children are not as likely
to be able to attend school regularly.9 These factors are directly linked
to the erratic and unstable nature of homeless childrens' existence.
Parents of homeless children, most of whom are single females, 0
lack the resources to avoid the above mentioned problems in raising their
children. The American Bar Association's recent report, "America's
Children at Risk", indicates that children who grow up in poor families
"are too often separated from their families because of problems

3. Geoffrey Mort reports that the policy ofdeinstitutionalization during the 1960's and 1970's
in New York City resulted in the creation of a sizeable number of homeless persons unable to take
adequate care of themselves. Geoffrey Mort, Establishinga Right of Shelterfor the Homeless, 50
BROOK. L. RBv. 939, 982 (1984). Mort also notes that between 1955 and 1974, the number of
persons hospitalized in mental institutions dropped from 559,000 to 215,000. Id.
4. Parker, supra note 2, at 544.
5. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 525.
6. Marion Wright Edelman, The Status of Children and OurNational Future, 1 STAN. L. &
POL'Y. REv. 17, 26 (1989).
7. Jim Morales, Reinventing Children'sRights, 12 SUM. DEL. LAW 14, 21 (1994). For an
example of judicial recognition of the physical and psychological problems faced by homeless
children, see Hansen v. Dept ofSocial Services, 238 Cal. Rptr. 232, 239-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
8. Laura Vogel, Children in Poverty: Welfare and Work Together Can Make a Difference,
3 SpG. KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 173, 176 (1994). See also Hansen, 238 Cal.Rptr. at 240, n. 8
(citing study results showing that homeless children had higher incidences of developmental
retardation than middle and lower class children); Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v.
Secretary of Human Services, 511 N.E.2d 603, 612, n. 15 (Mass. 1987) (discussion of stressful
situation of homeless families due to dislocation, loss of security, lack of friends and malnutrition).
9. Parker, supra note 2, at 844.
10. One estimate of the number of female-headed homeless households is as high as 80%.
Parker, supra note 2, at 844.
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essentially caused by poverty - not 'bad' parenting."'" Homelessness,
or the threat of becoming homeless, in fact, is the major reason why
children are placed in foster care.' 2 The adverse consequences to the
social fabric of the nation is demonstrably great, and the problem
requires society as a whole to address it. The strongest force at this
point is society acting through government. Thus, homeless families
require and should receive attention from the government to help lift
them out of penury so that they may raise their children with some
semblance of a stable, secure existence to become intellectually,
physically and emotionally capable adults.
B.

Causes of Homelessness

The origins of homelessness and the factors which perpetuate it are
both complex and numerous because of the diversity of persons who are
homeless and a multifaceted number of social, economic and political
factors which affect the poorest members of our society. The "cyclical"
nature of homelessness, with persons often finding only temporary shelter
from the streets, also makes the number of homeless hard to pin
down."3
One factor which contributes to homelessness is the inadequacy of
income from work outside of the home. As the recent Congressional
debate regarding the minimum wage has brought out, a person employed
full-time with a minimum wage salary has an income that falls approximately $3,000 below the poverty level.' 4 The minimum wage needs to
be adjusted above the poverty level. Congress has recently passed
legislation providing for an increase in the minimum wage."' Proponents of an increase have cited that one large benefit from a minimum

11. Morales, supra note 7, at 19.
12. Nancy Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 565, 575 (1989) ("in many cases homelessness leads to the actual removal of children from
their families."). See also Maticka v. City ofAtlantic City, 524 A.2d 416, 423 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987). The Hansen court reported that the "loss of AFDC eligibility follows the loss of

custody," and often permanent separation. 238 Cal. Rptr. at 239. Hansen involved a challenge to
a law which limited emergency shelter to children who have been "immediately removed from their
homes." Id. at 238.

The court found this statutory mandate contrary to existing law, which

advocated the preservation and maintenance of intact families. Id.
13. Stanley Herr & Stephen Pincus, A Way to Go Home: Supporting Housing and Housing
Assistance Programsfor the Homeless, 23 STETSON L. REv. 345, 346 (1994).

14. MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, (PBS Television Broadcast, Jan. 13, 1995) (comments by
Maynard Chapman, director of Colorado's Welfare Reform project). Mr. Chapman also stated that
minimum wage jobs do not pay enough to cover food, clothing and housing costs. Id.
15.

Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188 (1996).
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wage increase would be its potential to get persons "off welfare,"
because the increased wages will "make work pay." 16 As one member
of Congress stated, "'the best way to have welfare reform is to have a
job at a decent salary.""' 7
The problem of inadequate income levels for persons working
outside the home is greatly exacerbated for mothers who must find and
pay for child care while they are employed outside of the home. Some
depend on relatives and friends, but many must spend a sizeable portion
of their incomes on child care. For example, one recent study found that
families below the poverty level spend up to one-quarter of their earnings
on child care.'" One mother who is receiving welfare at the present
time spoke of the cyclical nature of her dependence, relating that when
she worked outside the home, she did not have adequate money for food
because her earnings were spent on rent and child care. 9 The lack of
income caused this woman to return to welfare.20 In addition, a number
of females bear children while still in school and must drop out in order
to care for them. This precludes them from obtaining an adequate
education to prepare them for future employment.
A related factor is the lack of available employment for unskilled
workers in general in today's economy. Frances Fox Piven and Richard
A. Cloward have noted there is "no economically and politically practical
way to replace welfare with work at a time when the labor market is
saturated with people looking for jobs."'
The level of welfare benefits similarly fails to provide a sustainable
level of income for most persons, and often is a cause of homelessness.
Payments, for instance, from the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program, the largest cash benefit assistance program,2" have

16. Minimum Wage: Mite House Sends Wage Hike Draft to Congress as Bill is Readied,
DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) No. 30, at D15 (Feb. 14, 1995).
17. Congresswoman Says Wage Increase is Welfare Reform, NEWS AND RECORD, Feb. 14,
1995, at B2. The current minimum wage level is $8,840 per year for full-time work. Id.
18. Vogel, supra note 8, at 187-88.
19. MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1995) (comments of
Michelle Gallegos).
20. Id. Ms. Gallegos recommended that the government provide supplementary aid for persons
who are first starting back to work. Id.
21. Betsy Reed, Welfare: Programsthat Work and those that Win, DOLLARS AND SENSE, Nov.
1994, at 12.
22. Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter AFDC] is a cooperative federal and

state program pursuant to federal statute, (42 U.S.C. § 601, et seq.) in which economic support is
allocated to poor families. The states decide the appropriate level of benefits, referred to as
"standards of need," and the federal government provides one-half of this level in monetary grants
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not kept up with the cost of living. Overall, the value of benefits from

AFDC has decreased by one-quarter from the beginning of this
decade. 3 The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reported that in
32 states the maximum AFDC payment for families with no other

income source fell below the poverty line by

50%.24

States have not

made up the shortfall. For example, in New Jersey, in the mid to late
1980's, the maximum AFDC grant to a family of four was $443 per
month, which added up to less than 60% of the cost of living for a
family in New Jersey.2"
The inadequate levels of benefits often lead to homelessness, as

housing and other subsistence expenses consume a large part of
income. 6 For those persons who are already homeless, the inadequate

benefit levels preclude them from buying or renting an apartment or
home. Cases in which plaintiffs have challenged the inadequacy of
welfare benefits predicated upon constitutionally-based social welfare
provisions are considered later in this note.
Compounding the problem of inadequate levels of assistance is the
fact that the eligibility level for receiving AFDC is set at a very low
point, so that many poor families are disqualified from receiving

assistance.28 Emergency assistance funds, part of the AFDC program

for those families who are homeless or are about to become homeless,
are hard to obtain. 29 Eligibility levels have also been the subject of

frequent legal challenges, sometimes presenting constitutionally-based

to states. See 42 U.S.C. § 602. As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities noted, "many AFDC
benefits are so low [since] many states pay less in benefits than those states themselves have found
to be necessary for a basic standard of living in that state." Isaac Shapiro & Robert Greenstein,
Holes in the Safety Nets: Poverty Programs& Policiesin the States, (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Washington, D.C.) April, 1988, at 9. States are not mandated to pay a level of benefits
which comports with their established standards of need. Id. Other cash assistance programs, Social
Security insurance and general relief programs, are available to those who do not qualify for AFDC.
23. Reed, supra note 21, at 12.
24. Shapiro & Greenstein, supra note 22, at 6.
25. Petitionfor Rulemaking, 566 A.2d 1154, 1156-57 (N.J. 1989). Massachusetts Coalition,

511 N.E.2d at 605, n. 3 (citing a study from the state's Department of Public Welfare discussing
inadequacy ofAFDC grants as creating acute problems, such as an increased risk of homelessness).
26. For example, in Massachusetts, 70% of welfare grants are spent on housing expenses by
recipients. Massachusetts Coalition, 511 N.E.2d at 605, n. 3.
27. Florence Wagman Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing, 428 PLI/Lit 9 * WL 20
(1992). Roisman reported that the average maximum monthly AFDC payment nationwide was
$416.00 and the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment was $544.00. Id. at 20.
28. Shapiro & Greenstein, supra note 22, at 9.
29. Id.
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arguments.3
A substantial number of homeless families are composed of women
and children, 3' and their homelessness, to a considerable extent, is
perpetuated by or a direct result of the failure of fathers to pay child
support.3 2 This does not count those fathers who are not married to the
mother of the child and leave her with the financial responsibility of
raising the child. 3 The absence of child support from fathers has made
it necessary for the government to provide extra aid to mothers and
children through such programs as AFDC. As one young mother who
is receiving AFDC payments stated, "if fathers helped pay child support
we wouldn't need to be on welfare., 34 Another mother called on the
government for tougher measures to track down absent fathers. 35 This
call for tougher measires has occasionally been reflected in the political
arena. For example, Representative George Miller of California recently
reported that the Democratic welfare reform bill contained a stringent
child support section with punitive measures for fathers who refused to
obey court-ordered support.36
Inadequate levels of housing subsidies also work to sustain current
levels of homelessness and to increase the homeless population. The
federal government provides housing subsidies through Section 8 of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.37 One Section 8
provision distributes vouchers for a portion of rent to eligible low income
persons, who then must seek out a landlord in the private market who is
However, several serious
willing to participate in the program.

30. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 10.
(PBS television broadcast, Feb. 7, 1995). It is often difficult and
32. It Was a Wonderful, ife
time-consuming to enforce court-ordered child support payments, due to problems in tracking
persons down. According to one Los Angeles county official, only 27% of their 300,000 cases
resulted in pay to divorced women. Id. One must also consider the reality that a number of these
fathers do not earn enough to pay child support. Roger Levesque, Targeting 'Deadbeat'Dads: The
Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMiNE J.L. PUB. POL'Y 1, * WL 13 (1994).
33. Levesque reports that one court has found unwed fathers responsible for the children they
fathered. See Orris v. Sullivan, 974 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1992).
34. MacNeil-LehrerNewshour,(PBS television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1995) (comments of Candi
Renkopf).
35. Id. (comments of Anna Nuenes).
36. MacNeil-LehrerNewshour, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 11, 1995) (comments of Rep.
George Miller).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f), 24 C.F.R. § 882.106. See also Barbara Sard, Housing the Homeless
Through ExpandingAccess to Existing SubsidizedHousingPrograms,36 U. ILL. L. REv. 1113, 1121

(1991).
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problems exist in the administration and enforcement of Section 8,
including drastic underfunding, mistrust and non-cooperation by landlords
in accepting Section 8 tenants, the government's failure to pay its share
of the rental expense each month, lengthy waiting lists and difficulty in
renewing participation in the program. 9 All of these work to render
persons homeless or perpetuate their homelessness.
Funding on the state level, for the most part, is meager, given the
current need. In New York State, for example, Governor Pataki has
recently proposed a reduction in housing allowances which would place
an allowance at approximately $260.00 per month for a three person
family that receives welfare benefits.4" It has been estimated that these
reductions would affect 21,000 persons and very well may render them
homeless, because this money is intended to complement the amount
used to pay rent.4 As will be discussed later, the level of housing
allowances set by the state has been challenged in court as being too
low.42
This raises the question of how much discretion should be left to the
legislature to set benefit levels, given the existence of a constitutional
provision in New York State mandating aid to the poor. The issue of
legislative discretion in this area is an important and complex one which
must be weighed in drafting a constitutional provision to aid the poor and
homeless. This issue will be addressed in the next section.
Yet another cause of homelessness has stemmed from the deinstitutionalization movement, which resulted in the release of large numbers
of mentally ill persons from state institutions, serving to increase the
number of homeless persons.4 3 Their mental problems often are
aggravated through drug and alcohol dependency, which is a general
plague amongst other members of the homeless population, as well.
Lack of a political voice amongst the poor is yet another factor
compounding the problem of homelessness. Combatting and eradicating
homelessness, although addressed as a policy problem, has not been a
priority within the fund-pressed state and local governments. For the
most part, homeless persons are not politically organized and do not
exercise their right to vote. Homeless children completely lack a

39. It was a Wonderful Life, supra note 32.
40. Ian Fisher, Pataki PlansDeep Aid Cutsfor the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at BI.
41. Id.

42. See infra Part V for discussion of case law.
43. See supra note 3.
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political voice.' Moreover, many legal challenges to inadequacies of
benefits and shelter allowances have been unsuccessful.
In addition, there has been a disturbing trend within some local
governments to address the homeless problem by sweeping homeless
persons off the street through the passage and enforcement of antiloitering and anti-begging laws. For example, the Second Circuit
recently upheld a New York City Transit Authority regulation banning
begging in the subways.4 5 The regulation withstood a First Amendment
challenge. The majority explained that begging does not "implicate
expressive conduct."46 This "out of sight, out of mind" approach
ignores the pervasive problem of homelessness. The legislatures which
passed these laws should consider reallocating their energies toward
longer-term solutions, like increasing benefit levels and providing for
greater economic opportunity in local areas, rather than expending funds
for law enforcement officers to carry out arrests of beggars, a number of
whom are homeless. As Peter Salsich points out, homeless persons who
are convicted under these laws face an even harder time procuring
employment.47
Instead of treating the homelessness problem as one to be kept out
of public view, these causes need to be examined more carefully by
legislatures. For example, in the case of homeless women and children,
legislatures have to become aware and act upon the problems of
inadequate benefit levels, the absence of affordable child care, lack of
provision made by schools for teenage mothers, and the lack of
responsibility of a considerable number of fathers in providing financial
support to mothers and children. The next section is devoted to
considering how state constitutional mandates regarding the care and
support of the poor can be one tool used to force legislatures to address
and to be accountable for these pervasive problems and to focus courts
on exercising greater scrutiny of laws involving aid to the homeless and

44. Representative Charles Rangel, referring to a hearing held before the Ways and Means
Committee regarding aid to the homeless and needy, remarked that no needy persons attended to
assert their views. MacAeil-LehrerNewshour (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 13, 1995).
45. Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).

46. Id. at 154. Regulations have also been upheld which ban homeless persons from sleeping
on public property or in vehicles. See, e.g., Stone v. Agnos, 960 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1992);
Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1990); Hersey v. City of Clearwater, 834
F.2d 937, 940 (1lth Cir. 1987).
47. Peter Salsich, Homelessness at the Millenium: Is the PastPrologue?,23 STETSoN L. REv.

331, 341 (1994).

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 1: 111

needy.
III.

INCORPORATION OF PROVISIONS ADDRESSING THE
HOMELESS PROBLEM IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

State constitutions are appropriate places in which to incorporate
provisions concerning aid to the homeless as part of a broader social
welfare provision which will serve as a mandate to the legislature and
compel courts to regard more seriously a state's obligation and commitment to provide for its indigent citizens. State constitutions, of course,
may go beyond the federal constitution in establishing additional
affirmative governmental duties and citizen rights and are an independent
source of constitutional doctrine subject to the right of state courts to
independently interpret their own constitutions.
A.

State Constitutions as Independent Sources of Rights

Constitutional rights are generally thought of as relating to the
federal constitution. Some of our state constitutions were created before
our federal constitution. Although state constitutions contain a number
of provisions also found in the federal constitution, state constitutions
should be viewed as separate and individual guarantees of individual
rights and governmental responsibilities. The federal constitution serves
as a floor with regard to the establishment and enforcement of individual
rights; state constitutions can and should go beyond the federal constitution when it is necessary to address state-specific concerns and crises or
to affirm a state's specific commitment to liberties and rights perhaps not
embraced by one federal constitution."
One important way in which state constitutions differ from the
federal constitution is in the more frequent inclusion of affirmative rights
of citizens and affirmative duties for the government. A number of
commentators have noted that the federal constitution sets forth a set of
negative rights which serve to establish limits on the power of government in citizens' lives.49 For example, the Supreme Court has been
48. For example, a recent Hawaii decision reaffirmed the state's strong commitment to a right
of privacy, which was incorporated into its constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
New York has been described as the strongest state in the area of social welfare rights. Gerald
Benjamin and Melissa Cusa, Social Policy in THE NEw YoRK STATE CoNsTITUTIoN: A BRIEFINo
BOOK, 238 (1994). See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
49. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
Bandes challenges the "conventional wisdom" that the federal constitution should be limited to and
interpreted as a document of negative liberties. Id. at 2274. Mary Ann Glendon cites the Supreme
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reluctant to find an obligation in the U.S. Constitution to provide aid to
the poor in the areas of housing and subsistence. In Lindsey v.
Normet,5" the Supreme Court denied that the government had a duty to
supply the poor housing or to supply financial assistance to the poor to
procure housing. The Court denied that any positive economic rights
existed in the federal constitution, stating that "the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are
unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwellings of a particular quality .... Absent a constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing ... [is a] legislative, not
judicial function."'
Similarly, in another important case, Dandridge v. Williams,52 the
Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to a state law which placed
a ceiling on the level of assistance a family could obtain from the
government, which resulted in larger families receiving assistance below
the poverty level. 3 The Court upheld the provision, stating that it
infringed on no protected federal constitutional interest. 4 While the
federal government has taken legislative steps toward the nationwide
problems of homelessness and poverty, federal courts have shown no
inclination to interpret the federal constitution to include an affirmative
governmental duty to aid the homeless.
State constitutions, on the other hand, contain many affirmative
governmental duties which have no counterparts in the federal constitution. These provisions set forth responsibilities which states owe to their
citizens and include affirmative duties to provide education to children,5" as well as social welfare provisions in their state constitutions,
the focus of this note. Several state courts have declared these constitutionally-based social welfare provisions to be "positive rights." For
example, in Tucker v. Toia, the New York Court of Appeals held that

Court's articulation of the view that the federal constitution is primarily a document of negative
rights in DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989), where the majority described the 14th

amendment as a "limitation on the State's power to act, [rather than] a guarantee of certain minimal
levels of safety and security." Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59
U. CHi. L. Rv. 519, 525 (1992).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Id. at 74.
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Id. at 482, 484.
Id. at 486-87.

55. ALA. CoNsT. art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art IX. The Supreme Court held that the U.S.
Constitution did not impose such a duty in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 1,35 (1973).
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Article XVII of the New York State Constitution, which provides for aid,
care and support of the needy, "imposes upon the State an affirmative
duty to aid the needy.' 5 6 Moreover, in the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, proponents of the social welfare provision
mentioned that it would serve as a "much needed definition" of the
obligation and "responsibility of the state to those who must look to
society for the bare necessities of life.""7
Thus, some states' constitutions have been, in James Gardner's term,
"active", that is "functioning as genuinely constitutive documents for
distinct state societies, [rather than] dormant, [or] serving as a reserve
means of protecting the liberty of a society ... whose identity ... is
'
national."58
Instead of merely reflecting national identity, states have
used their powers to recognize constitutional rights which reflect the state
citizens' own values and priorities and to codify the issues which they
believe to be most pressing and important. For instance, in enacting
Article XVII, the delegates participating in the New York State
Constitutional Convention declared such aid to be necessitated by "a
permanent problem of major importance" and "a concrete social
obligation."5 9 As one commentator noted, states are the appropriate
places for "laboratories" to experiment with social and economic change,
and hopefully serve as future models of success that will persuade the
U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the federal Constitution to recognize
rights in this area.60 States which have enacted these affirmative duties
in their constitutions may also serve as models for other states to adopt
similar provisions.
Moreover, states may arguably be in a better position to provide
these affirmative social and economic rights because they arise from

56. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977).

57. NEW YORK STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENT1ON, 1938: Revised Record, vol.111, at 2126
(Aug. 4, 1938) (statement of Rep. Corsi).
58. James Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1051 (1993).

59: See supra note 57 at 2126. See also Tucker, supra note 56, at 6, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730
(quoting REviSED RECORD OF CONSTITtMONAL CONVENTION, Vol. III, at 2126 (1938)). See also
Thrower v. Perales, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).

As another example, the Montana Constitution states that "[the legislature shall provide for
economic assistance and social rehabilitation services as may be necessary for those inhabitants
who...

may have need for the aid of society." MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3).

In Butte

Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986), Montana's highest court noted that
the delegates to the state's Constitutional Convention found welfare to be of "sufficient importance
to warrant reference in the Constitution." Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1311.
60. P. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:Rethinking OurDuty to the Poor,39
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51-59 (1987).
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problems faced within the boundaries of one state and may reflect
traditions of dedication to a particular area. In addition, they apply
solely to citizens of that state. Some federal courts may feel less
comfortable with imposing such a duty on all fifty states through
interpreting the federal Constitution to include affirmative social and
economic rights. As seen in Lindsey v. Normet,61 the Supreme Court
and other federal courts have expressed fear that interpreting the federal
Constitution to find affirmative duties would lead to limitless demads for
governmental services. Some members of Congress would agree with
this argument, especially those opposed to unfunded mandates by the
federal government.
In creating new affirmative rights under their own constitutions,
states are reacting to those specific needs that warrant one state's special
attention and concern, as well as responding to what arguably is an
unduly narrow interpretation of rights under the federal constitution.
Justice Brennan, a long-time supporter of using state constitutions
as independent sources of rights in a climate with a conservative federal
judiciary, referred to them as a "font of individual liberties."'6 It is
clear from federal precedent that problems faced by the poor and
homeless have not received the attention or the hospitable reception that
these pervasive and persistent issues affecting persons all over the nation
need and deserve. State constitutions should play a distinct role in
declaring homelessness and poverty to be social problems for which the
state must provide assistance.
B.

Why State ConstitutionsShould Contain a ProvisionExplicitly
Addressing the Needs of the Poor and Homeless

Addressing the problems of homelessness and poverty within a
state's constitution serves several purposes. The existence of an
affirmative duty to provide aid to the poor and homeless would represent
an explicit public acknowledgment of these problems and the state's
responsibility in addressing them. For example, during the Constitutional
Convention debates in New York, the delegates noted that including a
social welfare provision would highlight and "remove from.. . doubt"
the state's responsibility to its citizens in need.63 Such an acknowledg-

61.

See supra notes 50-51.

62. William Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV.
L.R. 489, 491 (1977).
63. See supra note 57, at 2126.
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ment may be used in support of greater legislative action in this area. 4
In fact, many social welfare provisions mention that it is the duty of the
legislature to enact laws to aid the poor.65
The role of courts is essential in enforcing a social welfare
provision. A constitutional provision would lend support to the need for
strong judicial scrutiny of laws which fail to meet the needs of the poor
and homeless because of their substantive content or due to the way the
laws are enforced. Thus, a constitutional provision will aid in giving
teeth to these laws. This view is in sharp contrast to the Supreme
Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet, where the Court gave minimal
scrutiny to the law at issue, since it did not affect a fundamental right. 6
As Gerald Benjamin relates, "[c]onstitutionalization of issues ... potentially gives a greater voice to courts in policy making, for they are the
final arbiters of the constitution." 67 The 1938 New York Constitutional
Convention debates made explicit mention of the crucial role of the
judiciary in enforcing Article XVII, stating that "no court may ever
68
misread" the "concrete social obligation" established by this provision.
In some states, courts have cited their own constitutional provisions
to implement the laws denying or limiting assistance levels or discriminating against certain groups in allocating funds. We have already seen
the New York Court of Appeals refer to the New York State Constitution
in Tucker v. Toia in striking down an eligibility barrier to a Home Relief
Program based upon age.69 Similarly, Montana courts, faced with a
challenge to eligibility levels, cited the Montana Constitution, which
provided for assistance to the poor.70 The Kansas Constitution includes
a section requiring the state to aid those in need,7 which its highest
court recently interpreted. In Bullock v. Whiteman, 72 the Kansas
Supreme Court pointed to the mandatory nature of the section's
language, and cited both the New York and Montana courts' similar

64. See infra part IV.

65. See infra notes 97-98.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
Benjamin & Cusa, supra note 48, at 233.
See supra note 57, at 2126.
Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 5, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 729.

70. Deaconess Medical Center of Billings v. Dept. of Social and Rehabilitative Services, 720
P.2d 1165, 1168 (Mont. 1986) (citing MoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3)). See also Butte Community
Union, 712 P.2d at 1311.

71. KAN. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
72. 865 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1993).

19961

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

125

interpretation of their constitutions' language.7 3 Although the existence
of a constitutional provision which addresses aid to the poor does not
necessarily guarantee that courts will interpret it to fully account for the
needs of the poor and homeless, its existence certainly produces a greater
chance that some courts will follow and apply it in challenges to social
welfare laws and programs.
On the other hand, courts are reluctant to find any constitutional
protection for the needy and homeless absent an explicit constitutional
provision directing such assistance. This is another argument for
including such guarantees in a state constitution. Courts have not been
receptive to claims of a right to shelter based on general constitutional
phrases guaranteeing liberty and happiness to citizens of the state. Three
recent cases illustrate this point.
In New Jersey, plaintiffs, whose state shelter allowances were cut
off, argued that the New Jersey constitution provided a right to shelter
through its constitutional guarantee of "inalienable rights," such as "life
and liberty," "acquiring and possessing property," and "pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness."' 4 The Court denied that any constitutional right existed to government funded housing, declaring that the
cited provisions guaranteed "freedom from undue interferences, not an
assurance of government funding."75
Also in New Jersey, mothers challenged AFDC limitations because
they would have the effect of rendering them homeless.7 6 In addition to
the provision relied on in the case previously discussed, these plaintiffs
also relied upon a provision in the New Jersey Constitution guaranteeing
"natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of... life and
liberty [and] property... and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
'
happiness."77
These plaintiffs also failed. Finding no explicit provision in the

73. Id. at 202. In addition to New York, Montana and Kansas, other states' constitutions also
contain provisions regarding aid to the poor, many of which have not been the subject of litigation.
For example, the following states' constitutions provide that government deliver maintenance and
aid to the poor: ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §
51; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 37; N. C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 20; CALIF.
CONST. art. XVI, § 11; IND. CONST. art. IX, § 3; LA. CoNST. art. XI, § 8; N. M. CONsT. art. IX, §
14; OKLA. CONST. art. XXV, § 1; TX. CONST. art. III, § 51-a. See APPENDIX, infra, for texts of
selected social welfare provisions from the constitutions of fourteen states.
74. L.T. v. New Jersey Dept. of Homeless Services, 624 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993).
75. Id. at 994 (citing Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982)).
76. Franklin v. N.J. Dept. of Human Services, 543 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
77. Id. at 66 (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1).
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constitution regarding public welfare assistance, and citing excerpts from
the constitutional convention rejecting such an addition to the New Jersey
Constitution, the majority found no mandate for the state government to
provide public assistance." The dissent pointed to the state's "parens
patriae" obligation, which was based on the constitutional provision
relied on by plaintiffs, as a basis for invalidating this legislative
limitation on aid.79 The dissent's interpretation differed markedly from
the majority opinion in its willingness to establish a standard for judicial
review of legislative determinations regarding aid and assistance. The
dissent's view also represents a broad interpretation of a state's duty to
its citizens within a generally worded constitutional section. This
approach, however, remains a dissenting one.
In a similar vein, an Ohio court denied assistance to plaintiffs
seeking funds to procure housing. Plaintiffs had been the victims of
"drastic cuts" in general assistance program funds, and, as the Court
described, "liv[e] on the edge of a society in which housing and
employment are often commodities available only to those with the
resources, education, and ability to acquire them."8" Plaintiffs relied
upon the portion of the Ohio Constitution which guaranteed "inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining
Plaintiffs placed particular reliance on the
happiness and safety.""
word "safety," contending that it "incorpordte[d] the right of destitute
citizens to receive minimal assistance sufficient in amount and type to
While acknowledging the "tremendous
prevent homelessness."82
impact" a denial of such a right would have on plaintiffs, the Court
rejected plaintiffs' reading of the state constitution as imposing an
affirmative duty on the government to aid and assist its citizens in
maintaining a level of subsistence.83 . The Court read this constitutional
provision to consist solely of "an aspirational statement of natural law
rights... which the state [may not restrict]."' Like the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lindsey and DeShaney, the Daugherty Court feared that such a
duty would "potentially thrust upon the back of state government the

78. Id. at 67.
79. Id. at 79.

80. Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
81. Id. at 1377.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1378.
84. Id. The Court added that the state constitution imposed no duty on the state to furnish
assistance for the happiness or safety of its citizens. Id. at 1379.
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affirmative duty and responsibility for providing for practically every
' 85
aspect of its citizens' lives," leading to a state of "legislative chaos.
The Court readily distinguished the explicit nature of Montana's mandate
in its constitution to aid the poor from the absence of such language in
Ohio's constitution.86
Delaware recently was faced with a class action claim that the state
violated plaintiffs' substantive due process rights by failing to furnish
adequate levels of welfare assistance.87 In denying any right to
financial assistance to obtain and keep housing, the Court noted the
absence of any provision to care for the needy, and pointed to the New
York State Constitution as an example of a constitution which included
such a provision. Its absence in Delaware precluded any constitutionallybased relief to plaintiffs. 88 The Court further stated that if the drafters
of the Delaware Constitution had wished to impose such an "affirmative
obligation" they would and could have done so, pointing to provisions
in the constitution where affirmative duties were created. 9
Political powerlessness of the homeless and poor, particularly
children, is another reason an explicit constitutional provision is
necessary. Legislative priorities and changes in appropriations make
regular assistance to these groups uncertain and tenuous. Too often,
legislatures fail to appropriate adequate funds to sustain programs for the
poor and homeless.9" Without some constitutional limitation, legislatures have unfettered leeway to enact spending cuts in these areas.
Codifying obligations within a constitution gives them greater permanence than statutes. Mary Ann Glendon, in discussing European and
Asian constitutions, has stated that: "[T]he constitutional status of social

85. Id. Governmentally-based affirmative duties to citizens only exist when a person is taken
into custody by government officials. Id. at 1380. This is yet another example of the reluctance of
some courts to read the constitution to restrict the number of positive rights of citizens and maintain

the overall tenor of the constitution as a document of negative liberties.
86. Id. at 1381.

The Court went on to cite the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to hold that

welfare benefits are a fundamental right, to support the conclusion that the state is under no
obligation to provide assistance to poor families who are homeless or about to become homeless.
Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). Montana's constitutional provisions have
no bearing on Ohio, the Court concluded. Id. at 1382.
87. Tilden v. Hayward, Civ. A. No. 11297, 1990 WL 131162, at * 15 (Del. Ch. 1990).
88. Id. at * 16.
89. Id. The Tilden Court, for instance, cited the provision in its constitution mandating the
formation and maintenance of public education. Id. (citing DEL. CoNST. art. X, s 2).
90. See, e.g., Berrios v. Department of Public Welfare, 583 N.E.2d 856, 861 (Mass. 1992)
(power of legislature to cut funding to agencies providing aid to the needy); L.T., 633 A.2d at 975
(legislature has power to cut appropriations to needy absent a clear mandate by law or constitution).
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and economic rights seems likely to have reinforce[d] welfare commitments by influencing the terms, the categories and the tone of public,
judicial, and legislative deliberation about rights and welfare."'"
A constitutional provision, to some extent, may serve as a check on
these cuts in appropriations, especially if it mandates periodic reassessment of benefit levels in light of changes in the cost of living. The
presence of a constitutional provision will serve at least as a mechanism
for courts to check legislative action that unduly ignores or fails to
comply with such a constitutional mandate. As mentioned above, courts
are obligated to follow the tenets of their state constitutions, but absent
a constitutional provision directly addressing the state's dedication to
dealing with these problems, courts are reluctant to interpret general
constitutional provisions to require such aid. As the concurring judge in
Daugherty remarked, "[o]ur task is not to determine whether the
legislation under review is wise, or even consonant with what we
consider to be the norms of a civilized society, but merely to determine
whether it has a rational basis."'92 The presence of an explicit constitutional provision would give courts the role of exercising greater scrutiny
in this area.
The next section assesses how a constitutional social welfare
provision should be drafted to effect the maximum amount of protection
to those groups for whose protection it is adopted - the poor and
homeless - and, at the same time, give the legislature and administrative
agencies leeway to enact policies which reflect the changing needs of
these groups.
IV. HOW EXPLICIT SHOULD STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS BE REGARDING AID TO THE POOR?
What should a constitutional provision covering aid and assistance
to the poor and homeless contain? Drafting a constitutional provision
raises a multitude of questions. What level of detail is appropriate for
a constitutional provision? Should a constitutional provision mandate
goals for the legislature? If so, how much discretion should the
legislature have? Should a constitutional provision setting forth affirmative rights to the poor include specific levels of benefits or caps on the
level of benefits for aid and assistance? To what extent should the
judiciary play a role in compelling the legislature to satisfy the constitu-

91. Glendon, supra note 49, at 530.
92. Daugherty, 621 N.E.2d at 1391.
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tional requirements? What level of scrutiny should the judiciary exercise
when reviewing statutes which implicate this constitutional provision?
Unlike legislation, constitutional provisions should be general
because of a constitution's role as a more overarching document whose
tenets are designed to meet the needs and goals of a state over a long
period, rather than dealing with narrower issues of more immediate
concern. This role of the state constitution is reflected, in large measure,
in the special procedures for constitutional amendments. For instance,
New York's constitutional provision on social welfare was enacted
during the Great Depression to deal with the pressing problems of that
time and to provide that such assistance "would meet the social
exigencies not only of the present but of the years to come."93 Thus,
by including this social welfare obligation in its constitution, its drafters
explicitly recognized they were dealing with a problem of more-or-less
permanent state concern.
State constitutions, for the most part, are more detailed documents
than the federal constitution. G. Alan Tarr concluded that many state
constitutions contain what he terms "statutory material" as a result of
feelings of mistrust of state legislatures.94 Tarr also mentions the
greater facility with which state constitutions may be amended when
compared with the federal constitution's amendment process. 95 Some
critics argue that these features undermine the idea that a constitution
should be a unified document which sets forth the "fundamental values"
of a state.96 Social welfare provisions in state constitutions, for the
most part, contain few or no specifics. Whether this is due to a view of
the proper role of the constitution or a reluctance to make long-range or
perhaps any commitments in this regard is problematic. The question of
the proper balance between detail and general principle concerning
homelessness in a constitution is the subject of this section.
If we examine the phrasing of a sampling of state constitutional
social welfare provisions, we see broadly worded sections designed to
serve as goals the legislature is to follow by taking steps, which, in its
judgment, will best meet these goals over the long term. Some

93. See supra note 57, at 2125. See also Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 6, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
94. G. Alan Tarr, UnderstandingState Constitutions,65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1181 (1992).
95. Id. at 1182. James Gardner notes that Louisiana has changed its constitution eleven times.
Gardner, supra note 58, at 1027.
96. Gardner, supra note 58, at 1029. As will be set forth shortly, state constitutional social
welfare provisions regarding aid to the poor are not at all specific. See infra note 97-101 and
accompanying text.
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provisions are broader in scope than others. For example, the Oklahoma,
Missouri, South Carolina and Michigan constitutions proclaim the general
welfare of their citizens to be a matter of "public concern," and call for
the legislature to establish agencies to address this concern.97 Similarly,
some provisions' wording is geared almost exclusively toward giving the
legislature complete discretion in this area. For example, California's
constitution, rather than articulating aid to the poor as an important state
goal, instead emphasizes that the legislature has the power to "amend,
alter or repeal any law [regarding] relief from hardship or destitution."98
Montana framed its constitutional provision regarding economic
assistance to the poor in discretionary terms, expressly leaving the
decisions regarding eligibility and duration of benefits to the legisla99
ture.
In even broader terms, Hawaii, in the preamble to its constitution,
enunciates the goal of preserving its citizens' quality of life."' Illinois
also sets forth the sweeping goals of eliminating poverty and attaining
economic justice in its preamble.'0 ' The general nature of these
provisions makes it more difficult to argue that the state has established
an affirmative duty to provide aid to the needy and to procure subsistence needs such as shelter. Rather, these are the goals that a legislature
may act upon whenever and however it chooses.
Other states, such as Texas, impose monetary limits within their
constitution on the amount of aid to be provided by the legislature for
social welfare assistance. Compared to other state provisions, the Texas
Constitution contains considerable language limiting the amount of aid:
The Legislature shall have the power, by the General Laws, to provide,
subject to the limitations herein contained and other such limitations ...as may by the Legislature be deemed expedient, for assistance
grants to needy dependent children ...and caretakers [and] needy
persons who are totally and permanently disabled.... The Legislature
may prescribe such other eligibility requirements for participation in
these programs as it deems appropriate and may make appropriations
out of state funds for such purposes. The maximum paid out of state
funds for assistance grants, to or on behalf of needy dependent children
97. OKLA. CONST. art. XXV,

§ 1; Mo. CONsT. art. IV, § 37; S..

CONST. art. XII, § 1;MICH.

CONST. art. IV, § 51.

See APPENDIX for text of social welfare provisions from selected state constitutions,
98. CALIF. CONST. art XVI, § 11.

99. MoNT. CoNST. art. XII, § 3.
100. HAW. CONST. Preamble.
101. ILL. CONST. Preamble.
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and their caretakers shall not exceed the amount of Eighty Million
Dollars ($80,000,000) during any fiscal year.' 2
The drafters of the Texas provision recognized that limits need to be
imposed on expenditures in establishing the structure of the state's
welfare system, and that economic fights for a state's citizens are not
absolute, but are subject to the fiscal constraints of a state's budget.
Indeed, Texas's provision does not mandate state assistance, rather it
confers the power upon the legislature, which has full discretion to
decide whether aid should be granted.
Some state provisions appear, on their face at least, to offer greater
protection to the poor than those of other states. Some are stated in
mandatory terms. New York, for example, sets forth that aid, care and
support of the needy shall be provided by the state.'0 3 Similarly,
Kansas, Alabama and Alaska all include the term "shall" in their public
welfare provisions, addressed to the state legislature! °"
Such provisions potentially offer greater protection to the poor and homeless, for
they force the legislature to face the issues and begin to implement
solutions. The mandatory nature of the provision may serve as a
stronger means of preventing legislative inaction or negative action in
this area. This has been the case to some extent in New York, where the
courts have cited the state's constitutional provisions as affecting their
decisions. 5
Is it necessary to supplement the mandatory language with language
making aid and assistance to the needy a fundamental fight? Use of
fundamental fights language would provide a state's poor residents with
a specific enforceable fight. It is interesting to note that the following
proposal was among the amendments to the New York State Constitution
in 1938 offered during the constitutional convention. The proposal
would have established such a fight:
The legislature shall provide that the essentials of food, clothing and
shelter shall be a fundamental right of and be guaranteed to the0people
6
of the state, regardless of citizenship or duration of residence.
Use of the fundamental fights language, or language making it clear that

102. TEX. CONST. art. I1, § 51-a.
103. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.

104. KAN. CONST. art VII, § 4; ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; ALASKA CONST. art. VII,

§ 5.

105. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
106.

NEW YORK STATE CONSTrTUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1938, Proposed Amendments, vol. I,

No. 360, Int. 341, May 19, 1938 (Rep. Lamberta).
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aid or assistance is guaranteed by the state, provides added protection to
those who are in need of aid and assistance for it gives courts a duty to
subject to strict scrutiny their examination of a law's constitutional10 7
ity.
In drafting a constitutional provision, a compromise must be struck
between creating a provision which is so detailed that it completely ties
the legislature's hands and risks becoming obsolete with changing times
and needs and creating a provision so general that it gives the legislature
unlimited or practically unlimited discretion to enact (as well as cut back
or revoke) laws, and even completely to ignore the constitutional
provisions. An effective constitutional provision designed to assure aid
to the homeless should prescribe clearly stated legislative obligations, but
it should not be so specific as to prescribe fixed levels of aid or benefits.
The greater the affirmative duty placed on the legislature by the
provision, the greater the responsibility the legislature will face and the
greater role the courts will play in determining whether the legislature
acted in accord with the constitution.
To aid in ensuring that the needs of the homeless are given priority
in a state's functions, a state constitutional provision should contain
several elements. First, shelter should be mentioned as one of the basic
necessities for which aid should be provided and be so defined that it
provides a baseline for the legislature to enact laws to provide both
monetary benefits and government-provided shelter. Second, the
provision should be phrased in mandatory terms. Third, the constitutional section should mandate regular reassessments of eligibility levels and
levels of assistance to ascertain whether they meet current economic
needs. These three elements are necessary to give content to a constitutionally pronounced need to assist the homeless. Each of these elements
will be discussed in light of recent judicial challenges to state constitutional social welfare provisions.
Another question which should be addressed pertains to the scope
of the provision. A provision for aid to the poor and homeless should
cover not only financial assistance, but also should cover employment
opportunity, health care and civil rights. These areas are important and
constructive in order to increase the standard of living in a state and
promote individual self-sufficiency. Several proposed amendments to the

107. See infra note 133 for discussion of the standard of review of the Supreme Court of
Montana's analysis of the proper standard of judicial review of the constitutionality of the state
legislature's welfare laws.
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New York State Constitution, for example, covered issues which took a
more holistic approach than now appears in state constitutions...
The state shall foster the public health and general welfare of its
citizens. To this end it shall, through legislative and executive action,
and to the greatest extent possible through a partnership of public
agencies and voluntary organizations, induce conditions to provide care
for the helpless, the needy, and the sick; protection against physical and
mental illness; maximum realization of the individual's self dependence; freedom from discrimination, unemployment, and the anxieties
of old age.' 8
Including a wider scope of issues within a social welfare provision helps
to accentuate the need for the legislature to simultaneously address the
problems of homelessness, unemployment and societal discrimination to
help create a better standard of living for the poor.
A.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

The following is a proposed provision designed to address the issues
previously considered.
1.

Preamble

Aid, care and support to the needy citizens of this state are matters of
paramount concern to ensure the maintenance of an adequate standard
of living for all citizens of this state.
The state shall guarantee eligible persons with aid for basic subsistence
needs, including food and shelter.
In conjunction with these ends, the legislature shall enact policies and
measures to promote economic well-being through, for example,
decreasing unemployment, combatting workplace discrimination,
providing facilities or funding for child care and increasing the minimum

108. NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1967, Proposed Amendments, Vol. IX,

No. 1181, June 12, 1967 (Rep. Kane); see also NEW YORK STATE CONSTTtrTIONAL CONVENTION,
1967, Proposed Amendments, vol. VII, No. 607, May 22, 1967 (Rep. Covington). This proposal

read:
It is the responsibility of a democratic government to do its utmost
toward provision of a decent life for all of the people; for the
government of the state of New York is charged to do all within its
power and means to the following ends: [these ends included not
only provision of housing and food, but also medical care, education, employment at a reasonable wage and freedom from discrimination].

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 1:111

wage on a regular basis to keep up with the cost of living.
2. Shelter
Shelter provided by the state shall satisfy standards of adequacy and must
include safe and sanitary shelter, together with necessities such as
electricity, running water and heat.
If the state provides money grants to procure shelter, those grants shall
be regularly reassessed to ascertain whether or not they comport with
current economic conditions to allow recipients to obtain shelter which
meets the adequacy standards required for shelter provided by the state.
3. EligibilityLevels
The legislature shall make provision to regularly reassess the levels at
which persons are eligible for government grants and aid for shelter,
taking into account current economic conditions.
The legislature shall make changes in appropriations and levels of
assistance in response to this reassessment.
No benefits shall be denied, terminated or reduced except in accordance
with due process of law, including the opportunity for a fair hearing
before such action is taken.
B. NECESSITY OF INCLUDING AND DEFINING SHELTER AS A COMPONENT
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISION

Shelter should be included as a subsistence need within a broader
social welfare provision in a state's constitution. No state constitutional
social welfare provision, such as those surveyed above, has included the
terms housing or shelter in its guarantees. At least one legislator,
however, had proposed that shelter be included in New York State's
constitutional provision. This proposed amendment, presented at the
1938 constitutional convention, read as follows:
The legislature shall provide that the essentials of food, clothing and
shelter shall be a fundamental right of the people of the state. 0 9
Similarly, during New York's 1967 constitutional convention, there were
proposals to amend the 1938 social welfare provision to include shelter
as part of the guarantee of aid and assistance to the needy. One proposal
not only called for housing to be explicitly included in the provision, but
109. See supra note 106.
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also called for "decent housing within the financial means of each
person."'1 0 A standard of quality thereby would be incorporated in the
provision for housing, and the legislature and administrative agencies
would be required to adhere to that standard.
The inclusion of the term shelter in a state constitutional social
welfare provision will have a twofold effect. First, it will accentuate the
state's recognition of the problem of homelessness and constitutionalize
the state's professed desire to take on the task of combatting homelessness. Second, it will bolster legal arguments that in providing
assistance to the poor, a portion of that assistance should be in the form
of housing or subsidies to obtain housing.
The problem with relying on the term shelter alone is that shelter is
extremely general and may range from unsafe, barely adequate lodging
in a homeless shelter or welfare hotel to clean, safe and private lodging.
Shelter should be given some meaning within the constitution at least to
establish a minimum level of adequacy which a state shall provide to its
residents.
There has been considerable litigation in reference to the level of
adequacy which government shelter should meet.'" Most courts are
reluctant to define what level and type of shelter suffices to meet the
subsistence needs of homeless citizens. For example, in Fountain v.
Kelly,"2 plaintiff homeless families unsuccessfully claimed a private
right of action to compel the District of Columbia to provide them with
housing in dwellings other than homeless shelters."' Plaintiffs complained of being "'warehoused' in overcrowded hotel shelters. . . often
without cooking facilities, refrigerators, or separate sleeping quarters for
adults and children ...to the severe detriment of their children's
physical and mental well-being."" 4 Plaintiffs demanded that specified
minimum housing standards be satisfied, and the standards should
include an apartment unit with cooking facilities, sleeping quarters and

110. NEW YoRK STATE CoNsTrrulnONAL CONVENTION, 1967, Proposed Amendments, vol. VI,
No. 21, April 17, 1967 (Rep. Bromberg); NEW YORK STATE CONSTITTIONAL CONVENTION, 1967,
Proposed Amendments, vol. XIII, No. 1011, June 12, 1967 (Rep. Badillo) ("[the] state ... shall
secure the... welfare of its inhabitants... by providing: assistance for the impoverished and

disadvantaged ... adequate economic development, employment opportunity, [and] housing'").
111.
to secure
112.
113.

A related question is whether the government is providing adequate funding for persons
their own shelter. This will be discussed subsequently, infra notes 139-148.
630 A.2d 684 (App. D.C. 1993).
Id. at 685.

114. Id.
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bathroom facilities."' The Court held that no entitlement to shelter
was created by the District of Columbia law, although the law did require6
the establishment of emergency housing units for homeless families."1
Although this case involved a statute, rather than a constitutional
provision, it illustrates the need to include some standards of adequacy
in a provision that deals with an obligation to provide shelter. It is often
an administrative agency which has the task of defining standards, and
its decision is largely determined by the availability of funding and the
policy priorities of the particular time. As an example, in Berrios v.
Department of Public Welfare," 7 the Court deferred to the administrative agency's narrow definition of shelter as embracing only temporary
shelter."8
Providing a clear, definite standard in the constitution
would help to avoid these scenarios.
Other courts utilized their constitutions to impose a minimum level
of quality on shelter in the context of homeless plaintiffs' legal
challenges. In Callahan v. Carey,"9 a New York court established
minimum necessities for shelter applicants, which were to include clean
bed clothes, secure conditions and a locker in which to store their
belongings. 20 The trial court cited Article XVII of the New York
State Constitution as a source of its holding.'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the need to meet a
minimum standard of adequate shelter in McCain v. Koch." Plaintiffs,
consisting of homeless families with children, argued that a common
sense interpretation of Article XVII of the New York State Constitution
required the government to provide shelter." Within the meaning of
shelter, plaintiffs argued this mandated adequate shelter with "minimum
standards of decency and habitability."' 24 Plaintiffs went on to de-

115. Id.
116. Id. at 686.

117. 583 N.E.2d 856. (Mass. 1992).
118. Id. at 862. One author has pointed out that a serious delegation problem could arise when
a legislature allows an administrative agency to determine the way in which constitutionallymandated rights are to be specifically implemented. Morawetz, supra note 12, at 572, n. 36.
119. Callahan v. Carey, NEW YoRK LJ., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Dec. 11,1979),
aff'd. 118 A.D.2d 1054 (Ist Dept. 1986).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 70 N.Y.2d 109, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987).
123. Brief for Appellant at 39, McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198 (1st Dept. 1986) (No. 41
023/83) (hereinafter Brie).
124. Id. Plaintiffs also cited a delegate at the constitutional convention who spoke, at the time
Article XVII was added to the New York Constitution, of minimum standards of habitability in
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scribe the "squalid," "filthy," "cold," and "rodent infested" conditions
which prevailed2 in the emergency housing provided to them by the City
of New York. 5
The McCain court did not explicitly base its opinion upon the New
York State Constitution, but stated that "whether or not plaintiffs have
any right to shelter under the state or federal constitution or statutory
law, [the Supreme Court] ...had the power to require the city, once
they undertook to provide housing, to make that shelter minimally
habitable."'126 Although not constitutionally based, this case is a good
example of how a court can enforce and even establish minimum
standards. 27 However, had the administrative agency chosen not to
establish minimum standards of habitability, it is arguable that the court
would have deferred to its decision not to do so, in the absence of a
constitutional mandate. Including standards in a constitution at least
provides assurance that minimum standards exist for shelter and that
there is some measure of stability and permanence concerning the
obligations to provide shelter.
C. NECESSITY OF PHRASING CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE
PROVISION IN MANDATORY TERMS

The use of mandatory terms like "shall" within a constitutional
provision serves several purposes. First, it reaffirms a state's commitment to the issue of aid to the poor and homeless. Second, it directs the
legislature to this important issue, and it sends the message that a
legislature should take meaningful steps toward addressing it. It also
has the potential of elevating a constitutional provision's purpose from
a precatory or merely idealistic goal to a mandate for legislative action.
The legislature must abide by this mandate or be subject to judicial
challenge for failure to comply with an affirmative, constitutionally-based

government provided housing. Brief,supra note 123, at 41.
125. Id. at 16, 33.
126. McCain, 70 N.Y.2d at 118,517 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The Court noted that the administrative
agency had already defined minimum levels of habitability for emergency shelter provided to
homeless citizens and that the only issue in the present case was one of enforcement. Id. at 119, 922.
127. After this article was completed, the New York Court of Appeals held that when an agency
establishes minimum standards for housing, a court's role is limited to ensuring that those minimum
standards are enforced. Mixon v. Grinker,N.Y.LJ., June 12, 1996, at 31 (Court of Appeals). Mixon
was distinguished from McCain, upon which plaintiffs relied, on the grounds that in McCain, there
were no agency guidelines. Id. Therefore, it was appropriate for the Court in McCain to establish
minimum guidelines. Id. On the other hand, in Mixon, where agency guidelines existed, the Court's
role was substantially limited to that of review.
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duty. Courts have recognized the mandatory nature of social welfare
provisions. For example, in Jiggets v. Grinker, the New York Court of
Appeals pointed out that "provision of assistance to the needy is not a
matter of legislative grace, but is specifically mandated by the New York
State Constitution. ' ' 2
The inclusion of mandatory language within a constitutional social
welfare section, as well as the level of specificity within the provision,
are inextricably linked to the degree to which the legislature will play a
role in this area. The use of discretionary language as to when and how
a state's concern about these pressing issues will be addressed by the
legislature is not adequate. The legislature should be alerted through the
use of mandatory language in the constitution that homelessness and the
provision of adequate levels of welfare aid must be legislative priorities.
This is especially true in light of the political powerlessness and low
voter participation rate of low income groups.'29 The proposed
constitutional provision is designed to ensure that legislation is enacted
to help lessen the problem of homelessness. Use of mandatory language
would serve two goals: to mandate the creation of laws to address the
problems in this area and to ensure that these laws, once enacted, are
enforced.
The New York State Constitution illustrates the use of a constitutional provision with mandatory language. As previously noted, the New
3 ' when faced with
York Court of Appeals in Jiggets v. Grinker,"
a
challenge to the adequacy of a Department of Social Services shelter
allowance, cited the New York State Constitution as "specifically
mandat[ing]" provision of aid, care and support to the needy.'
The
relevant Social Services law, which also used the mandatory term,
"shall," concerning the adequacy of benefit levels, was found to impose
a duty on the Social Services Commission to set the level of shelter
32
allowances to comport with the prices of New York City housing.
The Court's recognition that the language of a constitutional provision
was mandatory is a significant example of how mandatory language can

128. Jiggets v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 416 (1990); see also Perales v. Grinker, 565 N.Y.S.2d
7, 8 (ist Dept. 1991) (citingJiggets); Thrower v. Perales, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.

1987) ("[the] New York State Constitution of 1938 makes clear the affirmative obligation of the
State... [to] provide for the destitute."); RAM v. Blum, 425 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.
1980) (Article XVII fixes a duty on the state to provide aid and assistance to the poor).
129. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 128.
131. Id. at 415-16.
132. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. Svces. Law § 350(1)(a)).
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be used by the Court to compel adherence to realistic standards.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Montana, in analyzing a law which
cut off welfare aid to certain beneficiaries, recognized that its constitution's social welfare provision contained mandatory language which
established a "constitutionally-mandated duty upon the legislature to
provide economic assistance ...for the misfortunate."'3 3 The presence
of such language imposes an obligation on the legislature which, if
ignored, 4gave Montanans a "constitutional right for redress in the
13
'

courts.

Accompanying the use of mandatory language, there should also be
some guarantee that once assistance is furnished to an eligible recipient,
that it is not arbitrarily taken away or reduced. One New York proposal
to amend its social welfare section during the 1967 convention included,
among other things, a statement that "[n]o such grant of financial
assistance shall be denied, terminated or reduced except in accordance
with due process of law, including the opportunity for a fair hearing
before such action is taken." 135 The United States Supreme Court, in
Goldberg v. Kelly,136 echoed a similar view in 1970. The Court held
that welfare recipients have a property interest in the continued receipt
of welfare benefits which could not be terminated in the absence of due
process.137 In response to this Supreme Court ruling, states have
provided opportunities for hearings before benefits are reduced or taken
away.t38 The inclusion of such language will further guarantee sustained aid and assistance to those who need it by serving as a check on
government action.

133. Butte, 712 P.2d at 1314 (Sheehy, concurring). The majority applied a "middle tier test"
in analyzing the constitutionality of the welfare benefit provision, in which the state had the burden
of proving that the classification was both reasonable and based upon an important governmental
interest. Id. However, shortly after this decision was rendered, the Montana legislature voted "to
restore to the legislature" the power to set eligibility levels for services and programs for the poor.
MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COMPILER'S COMMENT, at 71 (Montana Code Ann. 1994). The
proposal was approved on November 18, 1988, and essentially overruled Butte by shifting the
standard of review of the courts in the area of welfare legislation to a rational basis standard. Id.
134. Id.
135. NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1967, Proceedings, vol. IX, No. 1252,
June 12, 1967 (Rep. Robinson).
136. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
137. Id. at 266.

138. New York State, for example, has instituted a "Fair Hearing" system, which furnishes
recipients of public assistance, food stamps, medicaid and other services provided by the
government, with the opportunity for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge if the
recipient's benefits have been denied, decreased or discontinued. NASSAU/SUFFOLK LAW SERVICES
COMMrIrTTEE, INC., A GUIDE TO FAIR HEARINGS.
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V. HOW A CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISION
SHOULD ADDRESS LEVELS OF FUNDING FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE TO THE NEEDY AND HOMELESS
The most pressing and difficult issue in attempting to lower the
incidence of poverty and homelessness is that of determining the level of
funding. A state legislature's commitment to the poor and homeless is
measured by its willingness to appropriate funds for welfare benefits and
grant measures in light of competing programs and other calls on
necessarily finite resources. Unfortunately, it is all too easy for some
legislators to lose sight of the ever present problems of poverty and
homelessness in deciding where to sustain or increase funding. This is
due in part to the relative powerlessness of the poor and homeless vis-avis other constituents. Many government-sponsored social welfare
programs are significantly underfunded, and the level of benefits often
is inadequate to sustain their recipients. 39' The purpose of this section
is to explore how a state constitution can address the vital issue of
funding for social welfare programs.
Although the social welfare provisions mentioned previously'40
recognize that the state should play a role in aiding the poor, the
important questions of eligibility and benefit levels, when mentioned at
all, are left entirely to the discretion of the legislature. For example, the
New York State Constitution mandates aid, care and support of the
needy, but adds that aid is to be provided "in such a manner and by such
means as the legislature may from time to time determine."' 41 The
Texas Constitution similarly leaves funding to the discretion of the
legislature in its social welfare provision, and, in addition, places a cap
on the amount of monetary aid which may be appropriated to programs
142
and benefits for the poor.
Courts in which recipients of state welfare aid have challenged the
eligibility standards and level of benefits have consistently recognized the
discretionary power of the legislature to establish these standards. The
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Bernstein v. Toia dealt
with the question directly and clearly. It held that the state would be
violating Article XVII of the New York constitution if it simply refused

139. See supra notes 22-29.
140. See supra notes 97-104.
141.

N.Y. CONST. art. XVII.

142. See supra note 102.
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to aid those persons who fell into the classification of "needy," but the
"absolute sufficiency" of aid given to those eligible is a determination
left completely to the legislature. 43
In another New York decision, Jiggets v. Grinker,'" recipients of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children claimed that the state
allowances for shelter did not cover their monthly rent. 145 In this
instance, the legislature enacted a law which mandated that shelter
allowances be "adequate.', 146 The Court cited a number of other
provisions of the Social Services Law which, in contrast, employed
discretionary language regarding public assistance in support of its
conclusion that the intent of the legislature in this instance was to
provide special protection through a mandatory level of assistance. 47
Thus the Court concluded that the mandate of adequacy "imposed a duty
on the Commissioner [of Public Welfare] to establish a schedule
reasonably calculated for that purpose.' 48 Although the Court cited
the New York State Constitution's mandate to aid the poor, its decision
to increase funding for shelter to adequate levels turned on the legislature's use of mandatory language in the statute.' 49 Had the legislature failed to use mandatory language in the provision of shelter
allowances, the Court's decision probably would have come out
differently. 5 Other states whose constitutions do not contain a social
welfare provision have been faced with similar challenges to the
adequacy of benefit levels.'
Unless the legislature has mandated the

143. Bernstein, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 348. Legislative discretion in funding levels was most recently
affirmed in Crawford v. Perales,612 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Ist Dept. 1994)), where petitioner challenged
the standards of shelter assistance as directly violative of the New York State Constitution, Article
XVII. Id. at 575. The Court stated that the New York State Constitution "does no more than
authorize the legislature to provide funds for the care of the needy." Id.

144. See supra note 128.
145. Id. at 95.
146. Id.

147. Id. at 95, 96, 97.
148. Id. at 97.
149. Id.
150. See also Perales v. Grinker, supra note 127 (citing administrative agencies' use of

mandatory language in its regulation as determinative).
151. See, e.g., Berrios v. Department of Public Welfare, 583 N.E.2d 856, 863 (Mass. 1992)
(referring to the legislature's power to restructure the emergency assistance benefits program despite

the fact that such action would cause "substantial hardship" to recipients); In the Matter of Petition
for Rulemaking, 566 A.2d 1154, 1162 (NJ. 1989) ("extent to which statutory standards are
implemented must be left to the legislature"); Franklin v. N.J. Department of Human Services, 543

A.2d 56, 62, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (legislature, not constitution, sets duty to allocate
resources such as public assistance); Tilden v. Hayward, Civ. No. 11297, 1990 WL 131162, at *6
(Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1990); Bouvier v. Wilson, 431 A.2d 465, 468 (Vt. 1981) (legislature is
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level of aid in its statute, courts have deferred to legislative and agency
determinations of benefit levels despite the presence of a constitutional
provision mandating aid.
Deference to the legislature certainly is proper in the absence of any
constitutional or statutory mandate to reassess benefit levels periodically,
given a legislature's constitutionally-based spending power. However,
considering some legislatures' unwillingness to appropriate increased
amounts of funding or to sustain current levels of funding for these
programs, a constitutional provision is needed to stress the importance of
adequate funding in this area and to give the needy and the courts the
power to force legislatures to address and meet the problem of inadequate benefit levels.
Although many decisions have explicitly recognized that state
benefit levels were too low or eligibility levels too strict,"52 their role
in directing the legislature to increase funding is limited. In a number
of instances, deference to the legislature has led to or perpetuated the
underfunding of programs designed to aid the poor, since levels of aid
have not kept up with the ever increasing cost of living. Inclusion in a
constitution's social welfare provision of a section which would mandate
the legislature or some other appointed body, such as a commission or
agency, to regularly assess the levels of benefits and eligibility for
benefits, would provide some added measure of protection for the poor
and homeless.
A separate section addressing funding is needed within a constitutional social welfare provision to give effect to the affirmative public
benefits which the constitution is designed to embrace in its goal of
aiding the needy. During New York's constitutional convention of 1967,
a proposal was made to add to the extant social welfare provision a
section addressing the issue of maintaining benefit levels on a par with
the cost of living. The proposal called for:
a minimum standard of income, to be based on the Consumer Price
Index, of all items, established by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
[to] be guaranteed every resident of the State. Such a minimum
standard of income shall be revised at least every five years based on

responsible for remedying any insufficiency of shelter funding).
152. See, e.g., Bouvier, 431 A.2d at 469 (court acknowledged the problem of underfunding of

benefits to the poor); L.T. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 624 A.2d 990, 996, n.2
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (court's calculation of grant level as meeting only 25% of the
statutory "standard of need to maintain a safe and decent life").
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such then current consumer price.'53
This proposal, if passed, would have furnished much greater guidance to
the legislature in this area than the language in the current New York
provision, which gives the legislature discretion to provide assistance as
it shall "from time to time determine." 1 4
A court would not be acting in excess of its powers if it directed
some entity, such as a legislature, an agency or a commission, to
reevaluate benefit levels or to review a reevaluation, since the court
would not be setting the levels. Rather, a court would be empowered by
such a provision to order another entity, such as a legislature or a
commission, to examine the current level of benefits, grants or eligibility
requirements, instead of leaving the issue of sufficiency of aid entirely
within the purview of the legislature. Courts are capable of recognizing
when benefit levels are not adequate to support persons under current
economic conditions, when faced with such claims.' 55
It is not enough, however, to rely upon plaintiffs to bring claims
regarding underfimding or inadequate benefit levels to trigger a
reassessment of benefit levels by the legislature. In addition to a
constitutional provision that addresses the reassessment of benefit levels,
other measures must be taken to work in tandem with this provision.
Legislatures should enact statutes or appoint commissions which require
them to regularly reexamine whether or not the level of benefits to the
poor comports with current economic conditions and to make changes in
appropriations in response to this examination. At least one state,
Massachusetts, has enacted a law which imposes a duty on the
Commissioner of the state's welfare agency to conduct an annual review
of its budgets to ascertain whether or not the funds allocated for benefits
are sufficient to "permit AFDC recipients to live in homes of their
own."'56 If an administrative agency's study concludes that there are
inadequate levels of funding for the next year, the agency must bring this
The legislature is then responsible for
to the legislature's attention.'
appropriating adequate funds or for taking some other measure to address

153.
May 22,
154.
155.
156.
157.

1987).

NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1967, Proceedings, vol. VII, No. 399,
1967 (Rep. Weiser).
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
See supra note 152.
Mass. G.L. c. 18 § 2(B)(g)(4).
Massachusetts Coalition v. Secretary of Human Services, 511 N.E.2d 603, 611 (Mass.
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the problem. 58 Although an administrative agency may complete a
study comparing the amount of money allocated to aid programs for the
poor with the cost of living, the legislature, at times, may not follow
through with necessary additional funding to provide for the updated
levels of aid.'59 The presence of mandatory language in a state's
constitution which establishes a legislative duty to reassess benefit levels
would give the legislature a firm duty to act and would give courts a tool
to aid in the enforcement of laws such as the just described Massachusetts statute. Placing such an obligation within a state constitution serves
not only to memorialize the more general goal of aid to the poor and
homeless, but also to address the very practical issues of sustaining levels
of aid.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the persistent and pervasive problem of homelessness will
not be eradicated merely through amending a state's constitution to
include social welfare provisions, a constitution is an appropriate place
to assert such fundamental goals of a state and to provide legislative
direction toward those goals. In addition to imposing a duty on the
legislature to enact laws regarding homelessness and to create agencies
to help enforce these laws, a constitutional provision should include
standards for the level of funding, as well as provision for periodic
reassessment of funding and benefit levels. These are essential if the
right to shelter is to be a positive, rather than a negative, right.
On a broader level, a social welfare provision should address the
right to shelter along with other issues, such as promoting employment
opportunities, providing adequate and affordable medical care and child
care, and decreasing employment discrimination. Focusing on these
issues together will provide one tool in solving immediate problems and
attaining a better standard of living for all citizens in the long run.

158. Id.
159. This problem was faced by the Court in MassachusettsCoalition. The Court reiterated the
statutory obligation binding the legislature, discussed above. Id. at 610-11.
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APPENDIX
SELECTED SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISIONS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88
"It shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several
counties of this state to make adequate provision for maintenance of the poor."
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 5
"The legislature shall provide for public welfare."
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 11
"The Legislature, or the people by initiative, shall have the
power to amend, alter or repeal any law relating to the relief
of hardship and destitution, whether such hardship and
destitution results from unemployment or from other causes, or
to provide for the administration of the relief of hardship and
destitution, whether resulting from unemployment or from
other causes, either directly by the State or through the
counties of the State and to grant such aid to the counties
therefor, or to make such provision for reimbursement to the
counties by the State, as the Legislature deems proper."
IND. CONST. art. IX, § 3
"The counties may provide farms, as an asylum for those
persons who, by reason of age, infirmity or other misfortune,
have claims upon the sympathies and aid of society."
KAN. CONST. art. VII, § 4
"[The] state shall provide, as may be prescribed by law, for
those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity or other
misfortune, may have claims upon ...society."
MICH. CONST. art. IV,§ 51
"[T]he public health and general welfare of the people of the
state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public
concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws [in reference
to] the promotion of public health."
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 37
"The health and general welfare of the people are matters of
primary public concern; and to secure them there shall be
established a department of social services in charge of a
director... by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
charged with promoting improved health and other social
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services to the citizens of the state..
MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3
"[The] state shall establish and support institutions and
facilities as the public good may require."
"[The] legislature may provide such employees assistance and
social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of
age, infirmities or misfortune are determined by the legislature
to be in need ... "
"[The] legislature may set eligibility criteria for programs and
services [as well as the] duration and level of benefits."
N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14
"Nothing [in this provision] shall be construed to prohibit the
state or any county or municipality from making provision for
the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons."
N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4
"Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the
orphan[ed] is one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian
state. Therefore the General Assembly shall provide for and
define the duties of a Board of Public Welfare."
N.Y. CONST. art XVII, § 1
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns
and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such a manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine."
OKLA. CONST. art. XXV, § 1
"[T]o promote the general welfare of the people of the State of
Oklahoma and for their protection, security and benefit, the
Legislature and the people.., are hereby authorized to provide
appropriate legislation for the relief and care of ... needy
persons who, on account of their immature age, physical
infirmity... or other cause, are unable to provide or care for
themselves. [T]he Legislature or the people.., are further
authorized, in co-operation with and under any plan authorized
by the Federal Government for State participation, to provide
by appropriate legislation for the relief and care of aged or
needy persons."
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 51-a
"[The] Legislature shall have the power, by General Laws, to
provide, subject to the limitations herein contained and other
such limitations ... as may by the Legislature be deemed
expedient, for assistance grants to needy dependent children
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and... caretakers, [and] needy persons who are totally and
permanently disabled."
"[The] Legislature may prescribe such other eligibility requirements for participation in these programs, as it deems appropriate and may make appropriations out of state funds for such
purposes. The maximum amount paid out of state funds for
assistance grants, to or on behalf of needy dependent children
and their caretakers, shall not exceed the amount of Eighty
Million Dollars ($80,000,000) during any fiscal year."
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 20
"As the health and morality of the people are essential to their
well-being and to the peace and permanence of the state, it
shall be the duty of the legislature to protect and promote these
vital interests by such measures for the encouragement of
temperance and virtue."
Norma Rotunno

